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Abstract.	   This	   paper	   is	   about	   evolutionary	   explanations.	   They	   come	   in	   different	  kinds	  but	  mostly	  need	  traits	  and	  functions.	  Evolutionary	  theory	  requires	  traits	  to	  be	  inheritable	  although	  not	  in	  a	  strong	  genetic	  sense:	  ideas	  of	  “inheritance	  pattern”	  and	   “inheritable	  pattern”	   are	   explored.	   Function	   is	   also	   a	  necessary	   concept,	   but	  complex	   and	   diverse,	   and	   it	   lacks	   causal	   power	   on	   traits.	   The	   debate	   on	   the	  evolution	   of	   morality	   is	   cautious	   and	   already	   far	   from	   naive	   “just-­‐so	   story”	  explanations,	   but	   theoretical	   analysis	   fleshed	   into	  morality-­‐related	   examples	   can	  aid	   towards	   the	   development	   of	   critically	   conscious	   and	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   explanatory	  hypotheses	  in	  this	  field.	  	  
1.	  Just	  to	  start,	  a	  basic	  (and	  discredited)	  kind	  of	  evolutionary	  explanation	  Evolutionary	  explanations	  come	  in	  different	  kinds.	  One	  kind	  Gould	  and	  Lewontin	  (1979)	  labeled	  Panglossian	  paradigm,2	  has	  been	  long	  criticized	  and	  it	  is	  not	  likely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “Riccardo	  Massa”	  Department	  of	  Human	  Sciences,	  University	  of	  Milano	  Bicocca,	  U6	  building,	  4th	  floor,	  Piazza	  dell’Ateneo	  Nuovo	  1,	  20126	  Milano,	  Italy.	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to	  be	  scientifically	  acceptable	  nowadays.	  It	  relies	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  trait	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  of	  its	  function	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  it	  consists	  in	  explaining	  the	  former	  with	  the	  latter	  by	  means	  of	  a	  “just-­‐so	  story”.3	  A	  trivializing	  example:	  why	  do	  birds	  have	  wings	  the	  way	  they	  have?	  Because	  wings	  are	  good	  to	   fly,	  and	  flying	   is	  manifestly	  good!	  So,	   why	   do	   we	   humans	   have	   morality?...	   Decades	   of	   conceptual	   critique	  warn	  us	  against	  answering	  by	  the	  explanatory	  scheme	  above.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  can	  see	  in	   this	   issue,	   the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  of	   the	  evolution	  of	  morality	   field	   is	  well	  beyond	  this	   point.	   Yet,	   I	   use	   this	   to	   problematize	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   trait	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   a	  function.	  I	  first	  concentrate	  on	  traits,	  following	  a	  taunt	  Francis	  Crick	  once	  made	  to	  the	  young	  Stephen	  Jay	  Gould	  by	  asking	  something	  like:	  “Why	  do	  you	  evolutionists	  always	   try	   to	   assess	   the	   value	   of	   anything	   even	   before	   knowing	  what	   it	   is?”	   (cf.	  Gould	  1991,	  p.	  138).	  	  
2.	  What	  is	  morality?	  Some	  evolutionary	  criteria	  for	  trait	  recognition	  We	   find	   different	   definitions	   of	   morality	   embedded	   or	   explicited	   in	   the	   various	  papers	  in	  this	  issue.	  Richard	  Joyce	  raises	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  precisification	  of	  moral	  sense;	   Philip	   Kitcher	   too	   cites	   the	   terminological	   issue	   “ethics	   vs.	   morality”,	  labeling	   it	   “just	   a	   technical	  philosophical	  problem”,	  which	   I’m	   sure	  he	  knows	   it’s	  not.	   My	   sense	   is	   that	   in	   studying	   morality	   either	   we	   have	   scarcity	   of	  precisifications,	   or	   we	   tend	   to	   hold	   back	   from	   choosing	   among	   the	   existent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Referring	   to	   dr.	   Pangloss,	   a	   character	   in	   Voltaire’s	   Candide	   (17…)	   engaged	   in	   explaining	   any	  feature	   of	   the	  world	   by	  means	   of	   its	   “usefulness”.	  Noses	   are	   there	   because	   they	   have	   to	   support	  glasses,	  and	  earthquakes	  have	  a	  hidden	  utility	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  world.	  3	  In	  reference	  to	  Rudyard	  Kipling.	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precisifications,	  or	   from	  declaring	   such	  choice,	  or	   from	  designing	  new	  ones.	  This	  situation	  might	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  still	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  grip,	  or	  it	  might	  be	  an	  explanatory	  strategy	  itself.	  Richard	  Joyce	  talks	  about	  “indeterminate	  concepts”,	  and	  Patricia	  Churchland	  cites	  Eleanor	  Rosch	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  “radial	  structure	  and	  fuzzy	  boundaries	  of	   concepts”.	  Yes,	  but	  we	  all	  know	   that	   this	  doesn’t	  wash	  away	  the	   scientific	   need	   for	   concepts,	   and	   furthermore	   for	   operationalizations.	   If	   we	  don’t	   feel	   like	   cristallizing	   our	   ideas	   about	   morality,	   the	   pragmatics	   of	  contextualizing	  results	  within	  certain	  premises	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  work.	  Evolutionary	  theory	  gives	  us	  some	  criteria	  to	  check	  when	  we	  identify	  a	  trait.	  
Heritability	   is	  among	   the	  most	   important.	  There	  are	  also	   interindividual	  variation	  (as	   I	   shall	   say,	   among	   the	   appropriate	   units),	   closely	   tied	   to	   heritability,	   and	   the	  possibility	   of	   building	   a	   fitness	   function	   on	   trait	   variation.	   I	  will	   briefly	   touch	   on	  these	   two	  when	   I	   talk	   about	   function.	   Notice	   that	   the	   link	   between	   the	   traits	   or	  structures	  and	  functions,	  however	  complex,	  cannot	  be	  broken	  in	  evolution.	  The	   evolutionary	   relevance	   of	   a	   trait	   depends	   on	   its	   inheritance	   pattern.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  loose	  claim:	  there	  have	  been	  periods	  in	  which	  evolutionary	  biology	  was	  very	  strict	  on	  this	  criterion,	  as	  both	  a	  cause	  and	  a	  consequence	  of	  focusing	  on	  
genes.	   Genetic	   factors	   are	   totally	   inheritable,	   and	   with	   Neodarwinism	   their	  patterns	  of	  inheritance	  were	  accurately	  modeled	  by	  the	  mathematics	  of	  Mendelian	  population	   genetics.	   The	   Modern	   Synthesis	   then	   emphasized	   that	   genes	   are	   all	  which	   is	   inheritable,	   thus	   binding	   evolutionary	   biology	   to	   them.	   Would	   we	   be	  working	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  morality	  within	  that	  hardened	  framework,	  we	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  ask	  first:	  what	  genes	  do	  give	  morality?	  Although	  sometimes	  the	  “genes	  for”	   or	   “genes	   of”	   morality	   still	   show	   up	   on	   newspapers	   and	   tv	   programs,	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professional	  scientists,	  also	  here,	  are	  manifestly	  working	  outside	  this	   framework.	  Churchland,	  for	  example,	  insists	  in	  affirming	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  “genes	  for	  a	  behavior”	  is	   	  meaninglessness.	  But,	   if	  morality	   is	   not	   a	   set	   of	   inherited	   genes,	   the	  question	  about	  heritability	  remains	  crucial	  in	  order	  to	  define	  what	  morality	  is	  in	  evolution.	  Of	  course,	  genes	  do	  not	  necessarily	  lose	  their	  importance.	  On	  the	  empirical	  side,	   Churchland	   argues	   that	   oxytocin	   and	   other	   molecules	   are	   essential	  components	  of	  a	  “neurobiological	  platform”	  for	  morality.	  And	  we	  know	  that	  these	  molecules	  are	  synthesized	  from	  inherited	  genes.	  On	  the	  theoretical	  side,	  models	  of	  
altruism	   evolution	   (e.g.,	   kin	   selection	   cited	  by	  Norenzayan,	  or	   group	   selection	  by	  Wilson	  &	  Sober	  cited	  by	  Schloss)	  are	  based	  on	  population	  genetics,	   and	   they	  are	  very	  important,	  but	  they	  make	  sense	  only	  by	  assuming	  a	  very	  reliable,	  Mendelian-­‐like	   heritability	   of	   the	   behavioral	   trait;	   they	   can	   therefore	   offer	   “how	   possibly”	  constraints	  on	  how	  we	  can	  treat	  genes	  involved	  in	  altruistic	  behaviors.	  But	  heritability	  has	  a	  larger	  scope	  today,	  thanks	  to	  revisions	  and	  extensions	  of	  Neodarwinism.	  Evo-­‐devo	  and	  epigenetics	  studies,	  for	  example,	  are	  forcing	  a	  shift	  towards	   talking	   about	   inherited	   processes,	   networks	   and	   developmental	  pathways.	  This	  is	  a	  new	  frame	  for	  evolution:	  the	  heritability	  pattern	  of	  a	  dynamic	  phenotype	  is	  a	  true	  locus	  for	  evolution	  (e.g.	  Müller	  2010),	  not	  captured	  by	  the	  level	  of	  genes,	  and	  being	   inherited	  thourgh	  a	  plurality	  of	   “channels”	  (Jablonka	  &	  Lamb	  2005;	   Jablonka	   xxx). 4 	  Authors	   like	   Churchland	   (2011)	   need	   to	   talk	   about	  phenotypic	  traits	  that	  are	  not	  detailed	  at	  the	  molecular	  level,5	  e.g.	  psychopathy,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Jablonka	  and	  Lamb	  (2005),	  for	  example,	  argue	  for	  epigenetic,	  behavioral,	  and	  cultural	  inheritance	  channels	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  genetic	  channel	  (cf.	  Darcia	  Narvaez	  on	  epigenetics).	  Odling	  Smee	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  contemplate	  ecological	  inheritance.	  5	  “The	  mechanism	  is	  unknown”,	  as	  Churchland	  contested	  to	  some	  speakers.	  
Emanuele	  Serrelli	   Structures	  and	  functions	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  morality	   June	  2012	  
	   5	  
they	   know	   that	  measuring	   heritability	   is	   crucial	   although	   difficult.6	  Now,	  moving	  from	   some	   identifiable	   gene	   or	   molecule	   to	   a	   behavioral	   pattern,	   or	   even	   to	   a	  disposition	   to	   behave,	   we	   may	   have	   a	   sensation	   of	   fading:	   how	   can	   we	   study	  heritability	  and	  homology	  of	  this	  stuff?	  But	  the	  point	  is	  right	  here:	  we	  are	  studying	  
evolutionarily	   relevant	   traits	   only	   if	   we	   can	   assess	   their	   reliable	   reappearance.	  Almost	  always,	  it	  will	  be	  a	  statistical	  measure,	  but	  there	  is	  actually	  a	  solid	  tradition	  in	  population	  genetics	  that	  –	  as	  strange	  as	  it	  might	  seem	  –	  doesn’t	  deal	  analytically	  with	   genes	   (Serrelli	   2011,	  Downes	   2010);	   and	  we	   often	   forget	   that	   fitness	   too	   is	  nothing	   but	   a	   probabilistic	   and	   difficut-­‐to-­‐measure	   dimension	   in	   biology;	  moreover,	  current	  studies	  on	  Quantitative	  Trait	  Locis	  are	  linking	  it	  with	  Mendelian	  genetics	  (Hartl	  &	  Clark	  2007,	  chp.	  8).	  All	  this	  gives	  us	  much	  flexibility	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	   traits	   we	   can	   consider	   in	   evolution.	   That	   is	   why	   I	   propose	   the	   most	   generic	  definition	  of	   a	   trait	   as	   an	   inheritable	  pattern,	   a	   pattern	   that	   is	   reliably	  produced	  generation	  after	  generation.	  Three	  short,	  final	  remarks	  on	  this	  view	  of	  traits.	  Firstly,	  often	  pattern	  perception	  and	  recording	   is	  not	   the	  whole	   story:	  we	  work	   with	  models	   that	   integrate	   patterns.	   In	   his	   writings,	   de	  Waal	   is	   careful	   in	  showing	   the	   diversity	   of	   models	   that	   can	   explain	   the	   observed	   behaviors.7	  All	  psychologists	   addressing	   morality,	   for	   example,	   have	  models	   of	   morality:	   Darcia	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  “Twin	   and	   family	   studies	   suggest	   a	   heritability	   of	   psychopathy	   in	   the	   range	   of	   about	   70%;	  childhood	   conditions	   such	   as	   abuse	   and	   neglect	   may	   contribute	   to	   those	   who	   are	   genetically	  disposed”	  (p.	  41)	  7	  Van	  der	  Weele	  (2011)	  emphasizes	  the	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  influences	  on	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  morality.	  Referring	  to	  Eisenberg	  &	  Strayer	  (1987)	  he	  points	  out	  a	  loss	  of	  diversity	  in	  the	  sources:	  empathy	  didn’t	  even	  exist	  in	  the	  English	  language	  in	  Darwin’s	  time.	  There	  can	  be	  interesting	  effects	  of	  “loss	  of	  diversity	  in	  the	  search	  for	  the	  sources	  of	  morality”.	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Narvaez	   relies	   on	   her	   “triune	   ethics	   model”,	   whereas	   Melanie	   Killen	   holds	   the	  “domain	  theory”,	  a	  narrower	  one	  as	  she	  said.	  But	  also	  in	  Churchland	  oxytocin	  plays	  
in	  a	  model	  of	  “attachment	  and	  bonding”	  including	  patterns	  of	  neural	  activation,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  is	  enclosed	  in	  a	  model	  of	  morality.	  Secondly,	  scaling	  up	  inheritable	  patterns	  at	  an	  evolutionary	  time	  scale	  is	  a	  really	   delicate	   passage.	   However,	   it	   is	   necessary,	   by	   definition,	   if	   what	   we	   are	  looking	   for	   is	   a	   trait	   that	   is	   able	   to	   enter	   the	   evolutionary	   arena.8	  At	   the	   scale	  of	  phylogeny,	  the	  issue	  of	  heritability	  becomes	  the	  issue	  of	  homology:	  the	  trait	  shows	  up	   in	  different	   taxa.	  Discerning	  homologies	   is	   a	   challenge,	   and	   requires	  a	   careful	  look	   at	   development	   and	   phylogeny	   (Pievani	   &	   Serrelli	   2011)	   to	   get	   around	  circularity:	   homology	   tends	   to	   depend	   on	   the	  model	   we	   have	   of	   the	   considered	  traits	   (Griffiths	   &	   Brigandt	   2007).	   Cooperation	   in	   mammals	   is	   not	   at	   all	  homologous	   to	   cooperation	   in	   social	   insects	   –	   at	   least,	   this	   is	   what	   I	   get	   from	  Churchland’s	   analysis	   but	   also	   from	   Pier	   Francesco	   Ferrari’s	   presentation.	   This	  means	  that	  we	  should	  cease	  from	  talking	  about	  “the	  evolution	  of	  cooperation”	  as	  if	  it	   were	   a	   single	   phenomenon.	   We	   saw	   yesterday	   that	   a	   homology	   between	  mammals	  and	  birds	  is	  more	  likely,	  if	  not	  apparent.	  Lastly,	   patterns	   can	   be	   looked	   for	   in	   units	   different	   than	   the	   organism.9	  When	  authors	  like	  Cristopher	  Boehm	  or	  Philip	  Kitcher	  or	  Ara	  Norenzayan	  identify	  sets	   of	   cultural	   ideas	   or	   socially	   decided	   norms	   that	   influence	   individuals,	   the	  relevant	  unit	  is	  the	  group	  or	  the	  society.	  In	  Philip	  Kitcher	  or	  Sober	  &	  Wilson	  (1998)	  or	  perhaps	  in	  Ara	  Norenzayan	  there	  is	  also	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  measure	  of	  fitness	  varying	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Thanks	   to	   Darcia	   Narvaez	   for	   her	   useful	   question	   about	   the	   sufficency	   Lewontin’s	   criteria	   of	  heritability.	  9	  And	  corresponding	  time	  scales?	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in	   correlation	   with	   patterns	   across	   groups.	   There	   is	   actually	   a	   very	   important	  difference	   whether	   we	   consider	   the	   domain	   of	   cultural	   evolution	   as	   part	   of	  biological	  evolution	  or	  as	  a	  social	  artifact,	  a	  tool,	  a	  device.	  But	  deepening	  this	  would	  be	  too	  long.	  Suffice	  to	  say	  that	  culture	  as	  an	  artifact	  allows	  co-­‐evolution,	  like	  when	  Narvaez	  talks	  about	  undercare	   in	  our	  cultures	  affecting	  our	  phenotypes,	  or	  when	  Boehm	  talks	  about	  genetic	  consequences	  of	  certain	  social	  organizations.	  	  
3.	  What’s	  the	  function	  of	  morality?	  As	   George	   Williams	   famously	   reaffirmed	   (1966),	   any	   trait	   has	   many	   positive	  effects,	  but	  in	  Neodarwinism	  not	  all	  effects	  are	  functions.	  Proper	  functions	  are	  only	  those	   few	  effects	  of	   trait	  T	   that	  have	  been	  “seen”	  by	  natural	  selection,	   thus	  being	  causally	  relevant	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  T.10	  In	  the	  following	  equation	  (Wright	  1931):	  [1]	  ΔqT	  =	  [sqT(1−qT)]/[1−s(1−qT)]	  
qT	  is	  the	  frequency	  of	  trait	  T	  in	  a	  population,	  coefficient	  s	  is	  the	  selection	  pressure	  on	   T,	   and	   ΔqT	   is	   the	   change	   in	   the	   frequency	   of	   T.	   Positive	   selection	   on	   T	  corresponds	   to	   qT	   increasing.	   But	   this	   depends	   on	   a	   lot	   of	   other	   factors,	   like	  population	  size,	  set	  of	  available	  alternatives	  to	  T,	  heritability	  pattern	  (see	  above),	  mutation	  pressure.	  Moreover,	  equation	  [1]	  says	  nothing	  about	  the	  reason	  why	  T	  is	  retained	   and	   spread,	   “in	   function	   of	   what”,	   T	   is	   there.	   Paraphrasizing	   Kitcher’s	  book	   (2011),	   finding	   a	   function	   for	   T	   requires	   us	   to	   specify	   a	   “problem	  background”	  in	  respect	  to	  which	  T	  is	  successful.11	  The	  “problem	  background”	  is	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  also	  Sober	  (1984)	  on	  traits	  that	  are	  “selected	  for”	  as	  opposed	  to	  simply	  “selected”.	  11 	  In	   analogy	   with	   technological	   progress,	   Kitcher	   says	   that	   “Attribution	   of	   functions	   is	  straightforward	  where	   there	   are	   clear-­‐sighted	  potential	   users	  who	   can	   express	   their	   desires	   and	  identify	  their	  problems.	  On	  other	  occasions,	  we	  can	  talk	  of	  functions	  even	  though	  cognitive	  beings	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there	   in	   [1],	   it	   is	   subsumed	   in	   parameter	   s.	   That	   is	   why	   scholars	   try	   and	   build	  evolutionary	   scenarios.	   Evolutionary	   theory	   gives	   us	   at	   least	   two	   ways	   of	  describing	  the	  “problem	  background”.	  In	  the	  first	  way,	  trait	  T	  appears	  in	  a	  fitness	  function:	  [2]	  w	  =	  f	  (A,	  B,	  …	  T)	  Fitness	   is	   function	  of	   traits	   in	  a	  paticular	  environment.12	  Wing	  size	  and	  structure	  varies	   throughout	   any	   population	   of	   birds,	   correlating	   to	   fitness	   of	   individuals	  bearing	  them.	  A	  description	  [2]	  requires	  a	  T	  to	  vary	  throughout	  the	  population	  of	  relevant	   units	   (e.g.,	   individuals,	   or	   groups)	   –	   remember	   that	   interindividual	  variation	  was	   also	   a	   criterion	   for	   identifying	   an	   evolutionary	   trait;	   it	   requires	   as	  well	   a	  measure	   of	   fitness;	   and	   it	   implies	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   covariance	   of	   the	  two,	  allowing	  then	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  populational	  spread	  of	  T	  [1].13	  The	  second	  way	  can	  be	  formalized	  as:	  [3]	  T	  =	  f	  (F,	  r)	  Trait	  T	  is	  function14	  of	  F	  (the	  overall	  functioning	  of	  the	  organism	  bearing	  T),	  and	  r	  (the	   role	   of	   T	   in	   such	   functioning).	   Birds	   fly,	   and	   wings	   have	   a	   role	   in	   such	   a	  functioning,	  a	  role	   that	  correlates	  and	  explains	   the	  existence	  and	  shape	  of	  wings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  desires	  and	  needs	  are	  not	  involved.	  Biologists	  and	  physicians	  routinely	  discuss	  the	  functions	  of	   organs,	   bodily	   systems,	   cells,	   and	   molecules”	   (p.	   219).	   But	   that	   transposition	   is	   not	  straightforward.	  12	  This	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  intuitive	  idea	  that	  T	  has	  a	  function.	  13	  Notice	  that	  equation	  [2]	  portrays	  the	  situation	  at	  a	  certain	  moment:	  different	   fitness	  values	  are	  obtained	   by	   checking	   out	   individuals	  with	   varying	   versions	   of	  T,	   not	   by	   transforming	  T	   through	  time.	  14	  Talking	   about	   function	   playing	   and	   imitating	   a	   mathematical	   language,	   where	   “is	   function	   of”	  means	   “depends	   systematically	   on”,	   some	   curious	   word	   games	   emerge:	   a	   trait	   does	   not	   have	   a	  function,	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  function	  of	  something	  else.	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Role	  is	  an	  important	  parameter	  because,	  for	  example,	  feathers	  or	  tails	  have	  a	  roles	  too,	  and	  of	  course	  differing	  roles	  yield	  different	  traits.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  Frans	  de	  Waal	  yesterday	  says	  that	  “the	  function	  of	  sex	  is	  social	  regulation”,	  or	  when	  Pier	  Francesco	  Ferrari	  talks	  about	  the	  “functional	  properties	  of	  groups	  of	  neurons”.	   But	   if	   [3]	   is	   considered	   the	   explanation	   for	  T	   –	   de	  Waal	   and	   Ferrari,	   I	  guess,	  do	  not	  –	  then	  it	  is	  the	  Panglossian	  explanation,	  and	  it	  is	  fatally	  undermined	  by	  the	  ubiquitous	  observation	  that	  functioning	  and	  roles	  are	  not	  causal	  upon	  traits	  and	  their	  structure.	  An	   example	   from	   Churchland’s	   book.	   She	   observes	   that	   “the	   palette	   of	  neurochemicals	   affecting	   neurons	   and	   muscles	   is	   substantially	   the	   same	   across	  vertebrates	  and	   invertebrates	   […]”	   (p.	  45).	  Oxytocin	   is	  a	  very	  ancient	  and	  simple	  peptide,	   found	   in	   all	   vertebrates.	   In	  mammals,	   “Oxytocin	   …	   is	   at	   the	   hub	   of	   the	  intricate	   network	   of	   mammalian	   adaptations	   for	   caring	   for	   others”	   (p.	   14).	   The	  striking	   thing	  –	  Churchland	  continues	  –	   is	   that	   “modest	  modifications	   in	  existing	  neural	  structures	  …	  can	  lead	  to	  new	  outcomes”.15	  Among	  mammals,	  then,	  There	  is	  a	  large	  “…range	  of	  social	  patterns	  […],	  but	  underlying	  them	  are	  probably	  different	  arrangements	  of	  receptors	  for	  oxytocin	  and	  other	  hormones	  and	  neurochemicals”	  (p.	   32).	   For	   Churchland,	   this	   is	   crucial	   to	   argue	   that	   behavioural	   and	   evaluative	  processes	   grounded	   in	   neurochemical	   mechanisms	   –	   she	   assumes	   that	   morality	  consists	   in	   social	   values16	  –	   are	  not	   confined	   to	  Homo	  sapiens.	   For	  my	  goal,	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  DISTRESS	  AT	  SOCIAL	  SEPARATION	  as	  a	  modification	  of	  a	  more	  ancient	  place	  preference?	  (Jaak	  Panksepp,	  textbook	  1998).	  16	  “That	  nonhuman	  mammals	  have	  social	  values	  is	  obvious;	  they	  care	  for	  juveniles,	  and	  sometimes	  mates,	  kin,	  and	  affiliates;	  they	  cooperate,	  they	  may	  punish,	  and	  they	  reconcile	  after	  conflict”	  (p.	  24).	  Churchland’s	   “Rule	   use”	   approach	   opposes	   rule-­‐based	   accounts	   of	   morality.	   “…take	   a	   close,	   and	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presence	  in	  the	  most	  different	  mammals	  implies	  T’s	   large	  insensitivity	  to	  F.	  What	  we	  normally	  call	  “the	  function	  of	  a	  trait”	  cannot	  cause	  the	  trait	  itself.	  The	  existence	  and	   structure	   of	   oxytocin	   simply	   cannot	   be	   due	   to	   its	   function	   in	   caring	   for	  offspring	   and	   in	   wider	   forms	   of	   sociability:	   “…the	   evolution	   of	   the	   mammalian	  brain	  adapted	  oxytocin	  to	  new	  jobs”	  (p.	  14).	  If	  equation	  [3]	  seems	  to	  be	  misleaded,	  perhaps	  another,	  dynamic	  expression	  might	  better	  reflect	  some	  current	  evolutionary	  approaches:	  [4]	  ΔT	  =	  f	  (ΔF,	  Δr)	  That	   is,	   in	   evolution,	   a	   trait	  may	   change	   –	   oxytocin,	   for	   example,	   does	   not	   –	   if	  there’s	   a	   change	   in	   the	   overall	   functioning	   of	   organisms	   (including	   ecological	  conditions)	   and/or	   in	   the	   role	   the	   trait	   plays	   therein.	   In	   sum,	   in	   Churchland’s	  words,	   “Biological	   evolution	   does	   not	   achieve	   adaptations	   by	   designing	   a	   whole	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  skeptical,	   look	   at	   the	   commonplace	   look	   that	   rules,	   and	   their	   conscious,	   rational	   application,	   are	  definitive	   of	  morality”	   (p.	   166).	   Stresses	   the	   EVALUATION	   aspect:	   “…my	   aim	   is	   to	   explain	  …how	  humans	  are	  able	  to	  evaluate	  a	  law	  as	  a	  bad	  law	  or	  good	  law	  or	  a	  fair	  law,	  /without/	  appealing	  to	  a	  yet	  deeper	   law	  -­‐	  something	  that	   they	  actually	  do,	  and	  do	  regularly”	  (p.	  166).	   “Moral	   theories	   that	  leave	   room	   for	   exceptions	   to	   rules	   have	   tended	   to	   seem	   incomplete”	   (p.	   168),	   so	   many	   moral	  philosophers	  (Aristotle,	  Kant,	  Mill	  &	  Bentham	  etc)	  search	  for	  exceptionless	  rules.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  “The	   ability	   to	   appreciate	  when	   a	   circumstance	   is	   a	   fair	   exception,	   or	  which	   rule	   to	   follow	  when	  rules	   conflict,	   embodies	   some	  of	   the	  most	   refined	  aspects	  of	   social	  understanding.	  Going	   through	  life,	   we	   all	   acquire	   a	   lot	   of	   subtle,	   and	   often	   inarticulable,	   knowledge	   through	   our	   experience	   –	  stories,	  examples,	  and	  observation”	   (p.	  167).	   In	   this	   light,	  Churchland	  criticizes	  moral	  psychology	  experiments:	  “A	  strategy	  for	  probing	  how	  people	  make	  moral	  decisions	  consists	  in	  contriving	  moral	  dilemmas	   designed	   to	   pit	   kill-­‐one-­‐save-­‐many	   against	   kill-­‐no-­‐one-­‐and-­‐let-­‐many-­‐die.	   Subjects	   read	  scenarios	  and	   then	  rate	   the	  moral	  propriety	  of	   the	  alternatives.	  Not	  surprisingly,	   response	  vary…	  The	  detail-­‐stripping	  is	  intended	  to	  eliminate	  confounds,	  but	  it	  introduces	  a	  new	  flaw:	  the	  scenario	  is	  so	  artificial	   that	   the	  brain’s	  normal	  reliance	  on	  morally	  relevant	   facts	   to	  guide	  problem-­‐solving	   is	  undermined	   …	   everyone	   uses	   case-­‐based	   reasoning,	   but	   given	   our	   individual	   histories	   and	  temperaments,	  we	  may	  draw	  on	  different	  cases	   to	  guide	   judgement	  concerning	   the	  present	  case”	  (p.	  183).	  Churchland	  sees	  rationality	  too	  as	  not	  restricted	  to	  humans	  (Ibidem).	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new	  mechanism	   from	   scratch,	   but	  modifies	  what	   is	   already	   in	   place,	   little	   bit	   by	  little	  bit.	  Social	  emotions,	  values,	  and	  behavior	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  wholly	  new	  engineering	   plan,	   but	   rather	   an	   adaptation	   of	   existing	   arrangements	   and	  mechanisms	   that	   are	   intimately	   linked	   with	   the	   self-­‐preserving	   circuitry	   for	  fighting,	  freezing,	  and	  flight,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  for	  rest	  and	  digest,	  on	  the	  other”	  (p.	  46).	  	  
4.	  Conclusion	  To	  summarize,	  there	  are	  several	  kinds	  of	  evolutionary	  explanations.	  The	  scientific	  acceptability	   of	   each	   kind	   varies	   throughout	   decades	   as	   the	   community	   of	  evolutionists	   matures.	   New	   kinds	   are	   invented,	   and	   overall	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	  diversity	  and	  integration	  of	  explanations.	  In	  most	   evolutionary	   explanations,	   structures	   and	   functions	   are	   required.	  However,	  they	  aren’t	  going	  to	  come	  for	  free.	  Choices	  have	  to	  be	  made,	  ambiguities	  can	  be	  tolerated,	  but	  I	  think	  that	  at	  least	  the	  aspects	  I	  presented	  (and	  there	  would	  be	   many	   more)	   have	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   careful	   consideration	   in	   order	   to	   build	  meaningful	  hypotheses	  on	  the	  evolutionary	  origin	  of	  morality.	  We	  have	   to	  deal	  with	   inheritable	  patterns	  of	  morality	   and	   their	   variation.	  We	   need	   models,	   we	   need	   to	   overcome	   circularity,	   and	   we	   must	   specify	   the	  relevant	  units	  of	  evolution.	   It	   is	  not	   impossible	   that	  our	  heritability	  analyses	  end	  up	   by	   de-­‐composing	   the	   trait	   we	   were	   interested	   in,	   perhaps	   even	   rendering	   it	  meaningless.	  Despite	  our	  interest	  in	  morality,	   its	  evolution	  can	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  evolution	   of	   something	   else,	   unless	   we	   are	   open	   to	   re-­‐define	   it.	   There	   are	   also	  possible	   overlaps	   in	  what	  we	   call	   trait	   or	   structure	   and	  what	  we	   call	   function	   –	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what’s	  the	  function	  of	  oxytocin?	  Is	  it	  relative	  to	  a	  neurochemical	  mechanism?	  But	  isn’t	   this	   mechanism	   an	   inheritable	   trait	   itself?	   These	   overlaps	   are	   due	   to	   the	  polisemy	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  involved	  terms.	  As	  for	  functions,	  they	  are	  are	  full	  of	  conceptual	  problems	  that	  are	  object	  of	  a	  rich	   debate	   in	   philosophy	   of	   science	   (e.g.	   Cummins	   1975,	  Wright	   1973,	  Millikan	  1984,	  1989,	  Griffiths	  1993,	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  1994,	  cf.	  Casebeer	  2003).17	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  functions	  can’t	  cause	  traits.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  functions	  are	  often	   the	   sights	   through	  which	  we	   look	   for	   traits.	  Moreover,	   function	   is	  a	   crucial	  element	   of	   Darwinian	   explanations.	   Functions	   and	   effects	   have	   to	   be	   carefully	  included	   in	   the	   explanation	   of	   morality,18	  also	   taking	   into	   account	   that	   non-­‐selected	   effects	   and	   creative	   re-­‐use	   are	   part	   of	   the	   deep	   nature	   of	   evolution.	  Richard	   Joyce	   cited	   spandrels	   and	   exaptations,	   and	   Frans	   de	   Waal	   responded	  defending	  an	  argument	  like	  “no	  need	  of	  special	  explanations	  for	  prevasive	  traits”.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  A	  trait	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  a	  system,	  but	  such	  role	  is	  rarely	  the	  explanation	  of	  its	  structure.	  Calling	  this	  role	   “a	   function”	   would	   be	   ok	   for	   the	   representative	   author	   Cummins	   (1975):	   "Relative	   to	   the	  "doorstop	  system",	  the	  hammer	  has	  the	  function	  of	  holding	  the	  door	  open.	  However,	  we	  would	  not	  find	  this	  a	  satisfying	  explanation	  of	  for	  why	  the	  hammer	  came	  to	  have	  the	  structure	  it	  did"	  (cit.	   in	  Casebeer	  2003,	  p.	  51).	  Calling	  it	  a	  function	  is	  not	  satisfactory	  for	  Neodarwinism	  (Williams),	  nor	  for	  authors	  representative	  of	  the	  etiological	  meaning	  of	  function	  (Wright	  1973,	  Millikan	  1984,	  1989).	  It	  can	   explain	   some	   modifications	   it	   recently	   had.	   According	   to	   Godfrey-­‐Smith’s	   (1994)	   “modern	  history	  view”	  of	  functions,	  the	  temporal	  reach	  of	  this	  explanation	  is	  limited:	  “Episodes	  of	  selection	  become	   increasingly	   irrelevant	   to	   an	  assignment	  of	   functions	  at	   some	   time,	   further	   away	  we	  get.	  The	  modern	   history	   view	  does,	  we	  must	   recognize,	   involves	   substantial	   biological	   commitments.	  Perhaps	   traits	  are,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  biological	   fact,	   retained	   largely	   through	  various	  kinds	  of	   inertia	  […]	  There	  is	  no	  avoiding	  risks	  of	  this	  sort”	  (Ivi).	  About	  the	  evolution	  of	  morality,	  Casebeer	  (2003)	  writes:	   “...we	   don't	   want	   to	   gravitate	   to	   either	   extreme.	   If	   we	   gravitate	   to	   the	   distal,	   super-­‐historically	   laden	  conception	  of	   function,	   then	   the	  only	  content	  we	  can	  squeeze	  out	  of	   function	   is	  that	   the	   ultimate	   function	   is	   to	   reproduce	   [...].	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   we	   move	   instead	   to	   the	  proximate,	  "instantaneous"	  analysis	  of	  a	  Cummins	  function,	  all	  historical	  content	  is	  lost”	  (p.	  52).	  18	  Is	  morality	  a	  function	  or	  an	  effect?	  Functionalist	  view	  makes	  us	  blind	  to	  “pure	  effects”.	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They	  are	  both	  right,	  because	  of	  how	  evolution	  works,	  and	  because	  of	  our	  growing	  understanding	  of	  that.	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